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INTRODUCTION

Deep Purple: Religious Shades of Family Law is part of an important

project in which Professors Naomi Cahn and June Carbone expose and explain
the diverging ideologies underlying some of the country's thorniest contemporary social issues-those involving families, young people, and sex.' In Deep
Purple, Professors Cahn and Carbone focus on religion's influence on public
debate and public policy. They implicitly embrace legal secularism 2 and denounce religiously grounded social policy and public discourse. They offer a
persuasive critique of abstinence-only sexual education, which they view as an
example of a misguided policy rooted in religious ideology. And they demon-

Associate Professor of Law, College of William and Mary, Marshall-Wythe School of Law.
J.D., Harvard Law School, B.A., Yale College. My most sincere thanks to Naomi Cahn for participating in the conference, to Naomi Cahn and June Carbone both for their thought-provoking
contribution to this Symposium Issue, and to the members of the WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW, for
their excellent work in coordinating, editing, and shepherding the Issue to publication.
I
110 W. VA. L. REV. 459 (2007) [hereinafter Deep Purple]; Naomi Cahn & June Carbone,
Red Families v. Blue Families,available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1008544 (August 16, 2007)
[hereinafter Red Families]. In their larger project, Professors Cahn and Carbone explore the relationship between religion, moral values, and law. They examine how the distinct ideological
commitments of the "red states" (those that voted for George W. Bush in the presidential election
of 2004) and the "blue states" (those states that voted for John Kerry in 2004) play out in the
regulation of families, sex, and sexuality. Id. at 6-7.
2
"Legal secularism" is a term used by Noah Feldman to describe the belief that there ought to
be strict separation between government and religion. NOAH FELDMAN, DIVIDED BY GOD:
AMERICA'S CHURCH-STATE PROBLEM - AND WHAT WE SHOULD Do ABOUT IT 182-85 (2005).
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strate that policymakers' and citizens' continued commitment to abstinenceonly education-despite evidence of its ineffectiveness-reveals the shortcomings of a religiously based approach.3
Part I of this Essay briefly summarizes Cahn and Carbone's article and
suggests that it raises, but doesn't fully resolve, two questions. Part II discusses
the first: is there any place for religiously grounded advocacy or decisionmaking in public life? Cahn and Carbone answer no, but the question is a complex one that has prompted much scholarly debate. Part III addresses the second: which way forward? Cahn and Carbone begin to sketch possible approaches; this Essay examines them and suggests another (admittedly prosaic)
alternative-a more patient reliance on the workings of both federalism and the
political process.4
I. DEEPPURPLE-AND THE QUESTIONS IT RAISES
Deep Purple begins by exploring the ideological rift that increasingly
divides the country. It canvases interdisciplinary research that gives insight on
how and why the worldviews of the religiously devout / traditionalists / political
conservatives differ dramatically from those of the less devout / modernists /
political liberals. 5 This research sheds light on both cultural and biological underpinnings of various individual orientations (e.g., conservative and liberal,
devout and less observant) and provides a fuller understanding of these divergent perspectives. 6 It helps to explain why the arguments of one group are frequently inaccessible or irrelevant to the other.7 Cahn and Carbone argue that
religiously grounded advocacy, which tends to proceed in absolutist terms, is
especially difficult to approach when all participants do not share the same
See infra notes 54-68 and accompanying text.
Cahn and Carbone discuss the development of different systems of family law and the polarization of family policy among the states in Red Families. They note that, "[i]f each system
proceeded on its own terms, within political and legal units that shared a common cultural framework, we would predict continued evolution, but not necessarily irreconcilable conflicts ....
Red
Families, supra note 1, at 60-61. Their article then considers the role of the judiciary in managing
the "intrusion of polarized political discourse into core issues of family law." Id. at 61. They do
not, however, address the possibilities for legislatively driven law reform and thus do not seem to
hold out much hope for such reform.
5
Deep Purple, supra note i, at 465-72.
6
Id. Recent research, for example, not only documents the relationship between regular
church attendance and political affiliation, but also suggests that heritable genetic factors may
make some individuals more likely to identify with conservative or liberal political attitudes. See,
e.g., id. at 465-68; Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life Surveys, Religion and the 2006 Elections, available at http://pewforum.org/docs/index.php?DoclD=174 (last visited October 3, 2007)
(chronicling church attendance and party affiliation in 2002, 2004, and 2006 elections); John R.
Alford, Carolyn L. Funk, & John R. Hibbing, Are Political Orientations Genetically Transmitted?, 99 Am. POL. Sci. REv. 153, 158-61 (2005) (concluding that genetics has a stronger influence
on ideology than does environment).
7
Deep Purple, supra note 1, at 469-71.
3

4
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background ideology.8 They conclude that advancing religious justifications for
policies renders public discourse unproductive at best.
Cahn and Carbone describe different positions likely to be staked out by
individuals of distinct orientations on various social policies (immigration, the
death penalty, etc.). 9 They note that varying orientations-especially devout
and secular-tend to correspond with different political allegiances. For example, evangelical Christians comprised fifty-one percent of voters in states that
voted Republican in 2004, but only twenty-two percent of voters in states that
voted Democratic.' 0
Cahn and Carbone choose teen sexual education as a specific policy
through which to develop their analysis. They examine the research evaluating
the relative effectiveness of abstinence-only education (which tends to be favored by the deeply religious) versus comprehensive sexual education programs. This research is striking; a growing number of studies have shown comprehensive education to be effective at reducing teen pregnancy and sexually
transmitted disease, whereas abstinence-only education generally is not.1'
Finally, Cahn and Carbone highlight the difficulty of finding middle
ground on what is essentially an "either-or" issue (i.e., a sexual education program will teach either abstinence-only, or abstinence-plus-more). 2 This, along
with the challenges of productive public discourse between starkly different
groups, highlights the intransigence associated with the issue. The unequal outcomes of abstinence-only versus comprehensive sexual education and the corresponding implications for the future of the nation's young people bring home its
importance.
In considering all of this, Deep Purple begins to wrestle with two difficult and controversial questions-one more theoretical, the other more pragmatic. First, is there any place for religiously informed political decisionmaking or religious discourse in public life? Professors Cahn and Carbone implicitly endorse the view that religion is a matter of private conviction to be kept
separate from politics and public policy. Others argue, however, that divorcing
religion from public life may be neither feasible
nor altogether desirable, and
13
that some middle ground is more appropriate.
Second, given the seemingly dim prospects for productive discourse or
political compromise on the issue of teen sexual education, which way forward
8

9

Id. at 465-67.
Id. at 467-71.

10
Id. at 472. The families of red and blue states also differ: families in red states tend to be
more religious, to be poorer, to marry and bear children earlier, and to divorce at rates higher than
those in blue states. Id. at 479-82.
11 See infra notes 55-57 and accompanying text.
12 Deep Purple, supra note 1, at 493-94.
13

See generally KENT GREENAWALT, PRIVATE CONSCIENCES AND PUBLIC REASONS (1995).

Others still argue that religion fully belongs, in all of its glory, in public discourse. See, e.g.,
Michael Walzer, Drawing the Line: Religion and Politics, 1999 UTAH L. REV. 619 (1999).
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appears most promising? Professors Cahn and Carbone resist solutions that call
for compromising on the issue, as it is one that has far-reaching consequences
for the future of the nation's young people.' 4 But it is possible that what is
called for is not compromise at all, but patience. Educating the citizenry about
teen sexual education programs may lead to increased pressure on federal legislators to change national policy. Similarly, states may experiment with different
programs and policies, and-in time-uniformity of practice may naturally
emerge as effective programs are copied and ineffective programs abandoned.
Taking this approach risks more teen births and sexually transmitted diseases in
the short term, but rushing to impose a more uniform (albeit "better") policy
requiring comprehensive sex education risks political reactions whose consequences might reverberate over the longer term. This Essay considers these
questions in turn.
11. RELIGION, DISCOURSE, AND POLICY

Cahn and Carbone suggest that religious individuals whose faith dominates their identity may be .so committed to their religious institutions that they
are less able to form commitments to other institutions important to democratic
participation.1 5 In other words, for the deeply devout, allegiance to religious
institutions may overshadow allegiance to political institutions, and their religious identity supersedes (or perhaps entirely dictates) their political identity.
Religious ideology, not independent judgment, governs their social beliefs and
practices-and their voting decisions. 6 While they do not say so explicitly,
Cahn and Carbone suggest that, because of this, too much religion is itself undemocratic.
Cahn and Carbone do not suggest that, for these reasons, the deeply religious ought not participate in public life. What they do seem to emphasize
(and to regret) is that while religion may have the power to encourage responsible and compassionate life choices, it can also polarize, creating deep, seemingly unbridgeable divides between adherents and non-adherents.
Cahn and Carbone argue that religiously grounded argument in public
discourse is not just polarizing, but unproductive. 7 Religious adherents who
advance religious bases for public policy "state a conclusion in terms of an appeal to authority that brooks no discussion or dissent."' 8 In other words, religiously based argument claims absolute moral authority and access to some basic
truth denied to (or rejected by) non-believers (or those who believe in a different
way). Religious arguments, moreover, may be inaccessible-indeed unintelli-

15

Deep Purple, supra note 1, at 494. 498.
Id. at 497.

16

Id.

17

Id. at 495.

18

Id.

14
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gible-to those who do not share the same or similar religious comprehensive
worldview. Instead of persuading (or even informing) listeners, then, this sort
of speech instead risks alienating them and stopping all conversation. 9 It is this
argument, related to but distinct from the first, to which I will turn.
Whether religion belongs in public discourse has been a hotly-contested
issue. Constitutional scholars and political theorists have weighed in, and many
have rejected bright-line or too-facile conclusions. Furthermore, arguments that
Cahn and Carbone criticize as detrimental to public discourse are deemed by
others to be evidence of an inclusive and well-functioning liberal democracy.
But Cahn and Carbone find broad support for their position among commentators. Constitutional scholar Bill Marshall, for instance, has stated that
"religion and religious conviction are purely private matters that have no role or
place in the nation's political process.,, 20 And John Rawls argued that all citizens deserve to have policies explained to them in terms broadly understandable
by the public at large:
[O]ur exercise of political power is proper and hence justifiable
only when it is exercised in accordance with a constitution the
essentials of which all citizens may reasonably be expected to
endorse in the light of principles and ideals acceptable to them
as reasonable and rational ... [T]he ideal of citizenship [thus]
imposes ... the duty of civility-to be able to explain to one
another on those fundamental questions how the principles and
policies they advocate and vote for can be supported by the political values of public reason. 2 '
Rawls and other scholars have thus argued that citizens and lawmakers
engaged in public discussion and deliberation should employ "public reason"reasons and modes of argument that are generally accessible to the public at
large. These include "(a) the general features of all reason, such as rules of inference and evidence, and (b) generally shared beliefs,
common-sense reason22
science.,
of
methods
noncontroversial
the
and
ing,
Public reasons therefore exclude advocacy premised on comprehensive
religious doctrine or philosophical moral theory. 23 Examples of nonpublic reasons include arguments based on utilitarian principles (considering pleasure and
pain to be the only values relevant to decision-making) or those premised on
religious belief in a sacred text authoritatively interpreted by church leaders as

19

GREENAWALT, supra note 13, at 157.

20

William P. Marshall, The Other Side of Religion, 44

21

JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 217 (1993).

22

Lawrence B. Solum, Novel Public Reasons, 29 Loy. L.A. L.REv. 1459 (1996).

23

Id.
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the source of binding moral obligation.24 Professor Lawrence Solum notes that
both the utilitarian and the theological premises are nonpublic reasons (despite
the former being secular and the latter religious) "because neither can be accepted as a reasonable ground for action by the public at large, which is understood as the body of citizens who are in full possession of the powers of human
reason and who nevertheless believe in a variety of reasonable comprehensive
doctrines. 2 5
Those who embrace the ideal of public reason urge its adoption as a
ground rule for public advocacy and lawmaking, but they do not go so far as to
suggest imposing legal restrictions on public debate (nor do Professors Cahn or
Carbone). 2f Instead, the theory of public reason is an ideal of democratic citizenship grounded
in political morality. 27 It is primarily "a counsel of self'2
restraint.

8

The debate around teen sexual education convincingly illustrates the
way in which advocacy premised on a religious comprehensive view can hamper public debate. Cahn and Carbone present those who currently advocate
comprehensive sexual education as committed to that position because it is supported by social facts. But these advocates might embrace abstinence-only programs if new facts came to light-if, for example, empirical data showed that
abstinence-only was effective. 29 But because the empirical data shows that abstinence-only does not work, their position is that we need to abandon it in favor
of a comprehensive program. Such a program furthers the ultimate goal of reducing teen pregnancy and sexually transmitted disease.
But to those who favor abstinence-only education, the empirical data is
irrelevant. Their justification for this position is grounded in a morality based
on traditional Christian teachings: premarital abstinence is itself part of a moral
life. To them, comprehensive sexual education is analogous to instructing one's
children not to skateboard, but then providing them with a helmet so that they
may more safely engage in the prohibited behavior. And they reject sending
this type of inconsistent message to teens. They view the ultimate goal of the
policy as reducing teen sex and ensuring the unity of sex, procreation, and marriage.3 °
Religious adherents' emphasis on moral justifications stymies those
who tend to reach policy decisions by considering empirical or social facts.
24
25
26

27
28

29
30

Id.
Id.
RAwLS, supra note 21, at 215-16; Solum, supra note 22, at 1466.

RAWLS, supra note 21, at 216; Solum, supra note 22, at 1466.
Kent Greenawalt, Natural Law and Public Reasons, 47 VILL. L. REv. 531,534 (2002).
Deep Purple, supra note 1, at 484-85, 491.
Cahn and Carbone note that "absolutist approaches place an emphasis on consistency. If

non-marital sex is wrong, then the ineffectiveness of the programs in delaying sexuality does not
itself justify a shift to programs that appear to sanction non-marital sexuality by providing greater
access to contraception." Id. at 486.
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And neither is able to make headway in their attempts to persuade, nor are they
able to locate common ground. Cahn and Carbone's example persuasively pinpoints the political impasses and fruitless dialogue that may result from religiously grounded advocacy or justifications for policy. But does that necessarily
mean that religion should be excised from public discourse?
Some who advocate the ideal of public reason nonetheless limit its
scope; others reject the ideal altogether.
For instance, Professor Kent
Greenawalt suggests that citizens acting in a non-public capacity may make
judgments on whatever grounds they find persuasive and need not exercise selfrestraint in their advocacy. 3' But the public role of legislators imposes upon
them obligations different from those of private citizens, circumscribing their
behavior-but only to a degree. Greenawalt allows that legislators, as the voice
of their constituents, ought to be able to take into account their constituents'
religiously grounded convictions when making political determinations. 32 He
also allows that it may be appropriate for legislators to give weight to their own
comprehensive views. 33 Because of their roles as public actors, however, legislators ought to be able to give public reasons for their political positions (even
those largely based on their own or their constituents' religious comprehensive
views), for the reasons discussed earlier.34 Greenawalt acknowledges that this
may result in some discrepancies between legislators' actual bases for judgment
and the bases on which they advocate in public discourse. 35 He reasons, however, that it is not necessary for public advocacy to reflect all bases of decision.
And sometimes it is indeed proper for legislators to publicly acknowledge the
religious or other comprehensive grounds that have influenced a determination. 36 He concludes that "[o]n specific issues, it may be appropriate for legislators to declare that they are affected by underlying religious grounds, but they
should make their arguments in other terms.

37

Rawls also limits the scope of the ideal of public reason. He restricts
his consideration of the situations in which public reason ought to apply to cases
involving "constitutional essentials" or "questions of basic justice., 38 He does
not explicitly consider whether it ought to also apply to "lesser" policy questions.

31

32

GREENAWALT, supra note 13, at 160.
Id. at 161. At the same time, Professor Greenawalt suggests that legislators should weigh

more heavily constituent positions grounded in public reason given that it is preferable to base
decisions on such reasons. Id.
33
Id. at 162.
34
Id. at 162-64.
35
Id. at 163-64.
36
Id. at 158, 163.
37
Id. at 158.
38

RAWLS, supra note 21, at 214.
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Other scholars, of course, resist altogether the ideal of public reason and
the notion that it imposes duties of self-restraint. They argue that liberal democracy should not seek to limit the means by which citizens reach judgments between competing policies, and freedom should include the right to advocate on
religious grounds. Political philosopher Michael Walzer suggests that public
reason is itself undemocratic, as "there is in fact no way of excluding absolutist
convictions and passions without excluding the people who hold them. So it is
better to welcome their expression and hope that the pressure of democratic
argument will ensure that absolutism is not the last word. 3 9 He argues that
democratic politics can-and ought to-permit religious and ideological groups
to mobilize whatever passion they can. n0 The important distinction, he claims,
is not between religious and secular advocacy, but instead between advocacy
and state-sponsored coercion. What ought to be "separated is probably not best
described as religion and politics. We [instead] separate religion from state
power. . . ." While democratic ideals demand that advocacy-including religiously based advocacy-be free and open to all, "coercion belongs only to the
state and has to be denied to ecclesiastical authorities and charismatic religious
leaders .... ,,42
Irrespective of their positions on the ideal of public reason, there is
broad consensus among scholars that religious ideology ought not be the sole
justification for any policy. Walzer draws a line between religious advocacy or
influence and religious coercion. He relies on constitutional limits to prevent,
for example, powerful religious groups from publicly imposing religious catechism. 43 Along similar lines, Greenawalt argues that even if a religious comprehensive view is the predominant reason for legislation in a legislator's own
mind, it is important that the same position also be supportable by public reason. 4
Allowing that religious advocacy will continue to exist in the public
square and that religious views will continue to influence policy, we are left to
consider the constitutional safeguard against excessive government entanglement in religion. Establishment Clause jurisprudence is murky, and identifying
its precise contours is well beyond the scope of this Essay. Yet it requires, if not
an impregnable wall between church and state,45 at least that government
"minimize the extent to which it either encourages or discourages religious be39

Walzer, supra note 13, at 637.

40

Id.

41
42

Id. at 635.
Id.

43

Id.

44

GREENAWALT, supra note 13, at 161-64.

Modem Establishment Clause jurisprudence began with the Supreme Court's ruling in
Everson v. Boardof Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947). In Everson, the Court articulated a separationist paradigm for Establishment Clause jurisprudence: "[Tihe First Amendment has erected a wall
between church and state. That wall must be kept high and impregnable." Id. at 18.

45
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lief or disbelief, practice or nonpractice, observance or nonobservance. ' ' 6 Even
for those who favor an approach that is more accommodating of religion's role
in society, "the Establishment Clause... at a minimum.., guarantees that government may not coerce anyone to support or participate in religion or its exercise, or otherwise act in' 4a7 way which 'establishes a [state] religion or religious
faith, or tends to do SO.
If anything is clear, it is that religion alone, or the desire to advance religion or religious ideology, cannot justify social policy. Yet, as will be discussed in Part Il, Cahn and Carbone make a strong argument that abstinenceonly education does nothing more than give effect to religiously derived ideology. Nonetheless, it is rare that those who advocate a certain policy (even one
stemming primarily from religious conviction) will be unable to demonstrate
some non-religious or non-moral justifications for it. 4 8 Indeed, the Supreme
Court found that abstinence-only education furthered secular purposes and upheld the Adolescent Family Life Act ("AFLA"), which includes funding for
programs aimed at preventing teen sexual activity. 49 Chief Justice Rehnquist,
writing for the majority in the five-to-four decision, found that the law "was
motivated primarily, if not entirely, by a legitimate secular purpose-the elimination or reduction of social and economic problems caused by teenage sexuality, pregnancy and parenthood., 50 (The Court's conclusion becomes more ques51
tionable when viewed in light of the empirical data that has since emerged.)
46

Douglas Laycock, Formal, Substantive and DisaggregatedNeutrality Toward Religion, 39

DEPAUL L. REv. 993, 1001 (1990).
47
Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 587 (1992) (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 678
(1984)). Constitutional scholar Steven Gey warns, however, that with recent changes in the Supreme Court (i.e., the confirmations of Justices Roberts and Alito),
[w]e may be on the cusp of a root-and-branch change in Establishment Clause
jurisprudence, which will fundamentally alter the landscape of church/state relations and produce a constitutional regime that specifically permits the government to endorse the views of the religious majority and use government
programs to advance the majority's sectarian goals.
Steven G. Gey, Vestiges of the Establishment Clause, 5 FIRST AMEND. L. REv. 1, 1 (2006).
48
A state statute criminalizing adult, consensual, private, same-sex sodomy was a recent and
relatively unusual exception. The Supreme Court, in Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003),
found that only moral justifications could explain the prohibition, rendering it impermissible under the Fourteenth Amendment.
49 Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589 (1988). AFLA explicitly permits states to award grants to
both religious and nonreligious organizations. Adolescent Family Life Act, 42 U.S.C. §§
300z(a)(l)-300z(a)(10) (2000). The Court held that the law treated religious and secular groups
equally, and noted that the First Amendment allows religious institutions to participate in publicly
sponsored social programs. Id. at 609. Welfare reform legislation passed by Congress in 1996
also provides funding to programs containing abstinence-only messages aimed at recipients of
public assistance. See generally, Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation
Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-193, § 912, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996); 42 U.S.C. § 710(b)(2) (1998).
50
Bowen, 487 U.S. at 602. Justice Blackmun wrote a strongly worded dissent, joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens. He concluded that the Act subsidized religious teaching
and advanced religion, arguing that "[g]overnment funds are paying for religious organizations to
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But Cahn and Carbone argue that constitutional considerations constitute only one aspect of the issue, and not the most important. They suggest that
the larger issue is the intertwining of cultural and religious views that, while not
shared by a majority of Americans, are nonetheless embodied in policy.5 2 Their

argument thus raises a second question. Assuming that we are operating within
the realm of the constitutionally permissible but that current policy is nonetheless objectionable, what practical strategies are most likely to work? The next
Part examines Cahn and Carbone's approach to this question and suggests another possible approach.
III. ABSTINENCE-ONLY VS. COMPREHENSIVE SEX EDUCATION: WHICH WAY
FORWARD?

A growing body of research strongly suggests that comprehensive sexual education is more effective than abstinence-only education at preventing
teen pregnancy and sexually transmitted disease. Comprehensive sexual education programs (which can include teaching the benefits of abstinence) are more
effective at reducing teen pregnancy and sexually transmitted diseases, and no
less 3effective than abstinence-only programs at discouraging early sexual activity.

5

Yet abstinence-only education comports with many religions' (especially fundamentalist denominations') general condemnation of nonmarital
sex, 54 and Cahn and Carbone note that those who are deeply religious are more
likely to support abstinence-only sexual education than those who are not. Recent studies, however, demonstrate that abstinence-only education is not only
55
less effective than comprehensive sexual education, but altogether ineffective.
A 2007 Congressionally-authorized study and recent studies by the American
Psychological Association and the Center for Disease Control all concluded that
abstinence-only programs have limited or no effect on the rate of teen sexual

teach and counsel impressionable adolescents on a highly sensitive subject of considerable religious significance." Id. at 635 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
51
See infra notes 55-57 and accompanying text.
52
Deep Purple, supra note 1, at 491.
53
Id. at 485-86.
Id. at 477. Cahn and Carbone note that most religions embrace the unity of sex, procreation,
and marriage.
55
Id. at 484-85. The authors discuss various studies, including an April 2007 review of federally funded abstinence programs authorized by Congress, a 2005 report issued by the American
Psychological Association, and a 2002 study conducted by the Center for Disease Control. These
studies found abstinence-only programs to have limited or no effectiveness at reducing teen sexual
activity. See id. at 484-86 Moreover, abstinence-only education appears to be correlated to reduced use of birth control and increased risk of sexually transmitted diseases. Id.
54
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activity. 56 Instead, abstinence-only programs correlate with lower rates
of teen
57
contraceptive use and increased risk of sexually transmitted diseases.
The case against abstinence-only education is a convincing one. Given
its ineffectiveness, it becomes difficult to imagine non-religious reasons for its
continued support. Indeed, this had led some commentators to find more support for the argument that publicly funded abstinence-only education programs
serve only to advance a religious viewpoint and, thus, violate the First Amendment's Establishment Clause. 58 But for our purposes, we assume no forthcoming change in constitutional doctrine. And Cahn and Carbone do not make a
constitutional argument; instead, they argue that abstinence-only education
represents nothing more than a religious viewpoint, does nothing to improve the
lives of adolescents, and is contrary to the preferences of an overwhelming majority of Americans.
Yet given that those who do support abstinence-only programs appear
unlikely to waver in their support anytime soon, what might be done? Cahn and
Carbone reject any solution involving compromising on the substantive issue:
"Compromise, which might involve teaching... only the abstinence education
component [of sex education, is] concession. 59
They imagine, instead, that we might seek "potential points of convergence." They suggest the possibility of "using the language of faith to support
the need for comprehensive sex education," or "comprehensive sex education
advocated by faith communities" 6 ° In short, they consider adapting rhetoric in
order to make comprehensive sex education more acceptable to those who currently oppose it. Thus, they surmise that "[c]ompromising on language-using
the language of faith-to advocate [comprehensive sexual education] policies
may provide leverage... [But c]ompromising on the law-allowing abstinence
only education because it is at least a form of sex education- serves no one.'
They perceive no real room for compromise. And there are, of course, genuine
questions about whether reframing the debate can result in widespread convergence or induce abstinence-only adherents to cross over to the comprehensive
sexual education side. (It is also noteworthy that Cahn and Carbone envision
introducing religion back into the discussion, albeit in a different way; this suggests that there may indeed be some value to a dialogue that goes beyond public
reason, at least in a context where one side is already communicating in this
fashion.)
56

Id. at 485.

57

Id. at 485-86.

58

See, e.g., James McGrath, Abstinence-Only Adolescent Education: Ineffective, Unpopular,

and Unconstitutional, 38 U.S.F. L. REv. 665 (2004); Julie Jones, Money, Sex, and the Religious
Right: A ConstitutionalAnalysis of Federally Funded Abstinence-Only-Until-MarriageSexuality
Education, 35 CREIG14TON L. REv. 1075 (2002).
59 Deep Purple, supra note 1, at 494.
60
Id. at 492.
61

Id. at 498.
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Given the binary nature of this issue (abstinence vs. more-than-justabstinence), the strongly held views on either side, and the resulting impasse, it
may be necessary to ask whether, from a policymaking perspective, there is any
way to bridge the gap. But is national consensus really necessary? The central
importance of this issue to the future of young people makes many impatient for
reversal of what appears to be improvident policy. And from that perspective, it
is hard to accept that change sometimes happens much more slowly than we
would like.
But slow doesn't mean static. The most promising option may simply
be one to which Cahn and Carbone refer but do not develop: 62 defer to the workings of the political process generally and our system of federalism in particular.
Federal legislation currently supports abstinence education. 63 Even if
the majority of citizens favoring comprehensive sexual education are not sufficiently mobilized to have that legislation changed or invalidated today, they
should receive information that (1) public monies are going to supporting abstinence-only education on a national scale; and (2) abstinence-only education is
ineffective. If the political process works as it should, they will then pressure
their representatives to withdraw support for the legislation, and failing that,
they may vote those representatives out of office (or at least note strikes against
them).
What Professors Cahn and Carbone chronicle might be, in one sense, a
perfect example of horizontal federalism in action. Different states are engaged
in different social experiments. Those experiments certainly may not unduly
interfere with individual constitutional rights, but short of that, this very sort of
state-by-state experimentation is at the core of our national system. It has frequently been noted that the states "serve as laboratories for the development of
new social, economic, and political ideas." 64
In the area of divorce, for example, fault-based regimes led to widespread collusion and pejury. 65 California was the first state to implement a pure
no-fault divorce regime, and eventually every state added no-fault or similar
grounds to existing statutes or replaced their divorce regimes with a pure nofault regime. 66 And a few decades from now, Massachusetts may be to gay marriage what California has been to no-fault divorce. 67
62

See supra note 4.

63
64

See supra notes 49-51 and accompanying text.
Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 787-88 (1982) (O'Connor,

J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); New State Ice Co. v. Liebman, 285 U.S. 262, 311
(1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) ("It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a
single courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and
economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country."). See also ERWIN CHEMERINSKY,
CONSTrrUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 315 (3d ed. 2006).
65
See Lawrence M. Friedman, A Dead Language: Divorce Law and PracticeBefore No-Fault,
86 VA. L. REv. 1497, 1507 (2000).
66
See Herma Hill Kay, Equality and Difference: A Perspective on No-Fault Divorce and Its

Aftermath, 56 U. CIN. L. REv. 1, 4-6 (1987). A number of states had provisions in their statutes
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Today, some states may enact systems of social regulation that tend to
reflect the religiously derived values of their citizens. Others may enact systems
of social regulation that tend to reflect different values. Open exchanges of information might eventually illustrate convincingly to the citizens of a given state
which of the existing policies enjoy success. Eventually, perhaps more states
will adopt the policy that better reflects the values of their citizenry; we can
hope that it will also be one that works.
CONCLUSION

Given that the empirical evidence demonstrates that abstinence-only
education does not work, Deep Purple persuasively criticizes the continued
commitment to it as driven by ideology rather than the goal of protecting young
people. 68 Professors Cahn and Carbone have eloquently laid out the policy dilemma facing the nation. But while the high stakes involved emerge clearly, the
way forward is less clear.
The dialogue between entrenched groups that they propose may be difficult, and any progress is likely to be slow. And there is no doubt that allowing
federalism to run its course poses some risk: legal secularists might view the
risk as the nation's young people getting married and having babies too young
(not reaching their own full potential, educational and otherwise), and religious
conservatives might view the risk as those same young people having too much
meaningless sex and living morally bankrupt lives.
Yet it is indeed possible that a combined approach-new approaches to
dialogue (perhaps a dialogue that Cahn and Carbone envision could accommodate both public reasons and religious elements) as well as both federal and
state-based advocacy-may ultimately result in national consensus that will in
the end reflect the right course for American society. It may take time, but there
appears to be no other realistic course of action.

that predated the California Act and that permitted divorce based on separation or incompatibility
grounds. Id. at 6 n.22.
67
Massachusetts is the first (and so far only) state to allow same-sex couples to marry. See
Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003) (holding the exclusion of samesex couples from marriage to be "incompatible with the [Massachusetts] constitutional principles
of respect for individual autonomy and equality under law."); see also Largess v. Supreme Judicial Court for the State of Mass., 373 F.3d 219 (1st Cir. 2004) (refusing to enjoin the implementation of Goodridge).
68
Deep Purple,supra note 1, at 486.
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